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CaseNo.20070231-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Daniel Steven White,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from the denial of a motion to withdraw guilty pleas to
dealing in material harmful to a minor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The State regroups Defendant's seven arguments into two:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw
Defendant's guilty pleas?
Standard ofReview. A denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed
for abuse of discretion; any underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error.
State v. Bedstead, 2006 UT 42, U 7,140 P.3d 1288.

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering diagnostic assessments
of Defendant before sentencing him?
Standard of Review. A sentencing decision will be overturned only if "the
actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse of
discretion." State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, % 18,191 P.3d 17.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following provisions are attached in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In October 2005, Defendant was charged with two counts of rape, or, in the
alternative, unlawful sexual activity with a minor (R. 3-1). In the same Information,
he was also charged with two counts of dealing in material harmful to a minor, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206 (West 2004) (id.).
All of the charges arose from Defendant's sexual relationship with a fourteen-yearold girl (R. 4-3 & 15-14).
The prosecutor provided defense counsel, Anthony Rippa, with a lengthy
police report that summarized the victim's two videotaped interviews at the
Division of Children and Family Services [DCFS] (R. 69 & 105; R257:12). The report
and other discovery revealed that during the first interview, with a social worker,
2

the fourteen-year-old victim admitted she was having sex with someone older than
herself, but refused to identify the person, other than to deny it was Defendant (R.
15-14 & 69; R257:12). During a second interview, with a police detective, the victim
reluctantly admitted that Defendant was her boyfriend and that they had engaged
in sexual intercourse at least 15 times (id.). At Defendant's request, she had
photographed him in the nude, with his "turgid" penis exposed (id.). The defense
was provided with copies of the photographs (R257:13).l
On the day of preliminary hearing, a plea agreement was reached: Defendant
would plead guilty to the two counts of dealing in material harmful to a minor and
the two rape/sexual activity charges would be dismissed (R.34 & 34; R115:2). The
court asked the prosecutor if she had consulted the victim or her family:
Prosecutor: Yes, I have your Honor. The victim's father and mother are
here [in the courtroom]. I have talked with them about the resolution.
The victim is also here. She's not present in the courtroom, but she's in
the courthouse. I've spoken with her about the resolution. They are in
agreement with it.

lr

This discovery, including the police summary of the interviews, was
provided to the defense in the months before Defendant pled (R257:12). None of
this information is sealed.
A copy of the videotaped interviews was not provided until after Defendant
had entered his plea (R. 98). A DVD version and transcript of the interviews,
together with the photographs of Defendant, are included in the record, but are
under seal (R. 245). The State refers to the sealed portions of the record only in
general terms and as necessary to respond to Defendant's allegations.
3

(R115:3). The court then conducted a colloquy with Defendant pursuant to rule 11,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R115:2-8).2 A written Statement in Advance of
Plea was signed by Defendant and incorporated into the record (R. 42-37). In the
Statement, Defendant acknowledged that no promise had been made to him as to
what sentence he would receive and that he knew he could be sentenced to prison
(R. 38-39). The court asked the prosecutor to state the factual basis for the pleas:
Prosecutor: Yes, your Honor. Between June 1st of 2005 and October 1st
of 2005 [,] the defendant was engaged with - in a sexual relationship
with a 14-year-old girl in Highland, which is in Utah County. As part
of that relationship he had her take pictures of himself while sexually
aroused, and they are pornographic - those pictures are pornographic
in nature... She not only took the pictures. She also saw them, viewed
t h e m . . . Exhibited them to her.
(R115:7-8). The court asked Defendant, "Is that what happened on those occasions,
sir?" Defendant responded, "Yes, sir" (R115: 8). See also Addendum B.
The court found that the guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary (R115: 7).
The court ordered a presentence investigative report [PSR] and directed that it
include a psychosexual evaluation of Defendant because "we're dealing with a 14year-old" victim (R115: 8). Defendant did not object (id.).

2

Rule 11 "is designed to protect an individual's rights when entering a guilty
plea by ensuring that the defendant receives full notice of the charges, the elements,
how the defendant's conduct amounts to a crime, [and] the consequences of the
plea[.]" State v. Bluemel, 2007 UT 90, f 17,173 P.3d 842 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
4

The PSR was completed one month later, in March 2006 (R. 101).3 The report
summarized Defendant's prior sexual offense with a different victim, his prolonged
involvement with the juvenile system, and Dr. Larry Fox's current psychosexual
evaluation of Defendant, including the doctor's recommendation that Defendant
receive sex offender treatment in a secure setting (id. at 2-5). The PSR recommended
that Defendant serve a year in jail and then be released on probation, subject to his
participation in a sex-offender treatment program (id.).
Defendant hired new counsel (Thomas Burton), his present appellate counsel
(R. 46 & 44). New counsel reviewed the discovery previously provided and then
subpoenaed "any and all" DCFS records that"directly or indirectly" referred to the
victim or any member of her family (R. 63-59). After DCFS objected to the
subpoena, it was quashed (R. 72-86). Nevertheless, the defense was provided with a
copy and a transcript of the DCFS interviews of the victim, the same interviews that
had previously been summarized in a lengthy police report provided to the defense
(R. 98; R257:12).
Subsequently, the defense filed a motion to withdraw Defendant's guilty
pleas, asserting that the prosecution committed misconduct in failing to turn over a
copy of the DCFS interviews before Defendant pled guilty; that Defendant's plea
3

Because the PSR is under seal, the State refers to its contents only in general
terms and as necessary to response to Defendant's assertions.
5

counsel was ineffective in advising him to plead guilty before receiving those tapes
and before a preliminary hearing was conducted; and that the facts admitted by
Defendant when he pled guilty did not as a matter of laiw constitute a crime (R. 9992). Defendant further alleged that if he had had the DCFS tapes earlier, he would
not have pled guilty because, the tapes established tihat the victim would have
refused to testify (R. 98; R257: 4). The prosecutor disputed the allegation and
responded that the motion failed to establish that Defendant's pleas were not
knowing and voluntary (R. 11442; R257:13).
The court reviewed the DCFS tapes (R. 145). The court found that the DCFS
tapes contained no new or pivotal information (R. 144). The court found nothing to
support Defendant's allegation that the victim would have refused to testify. The
court found that, at best, the tapes showed that the fourteen-year-old victim "clearly
felt responsible for the sexual conduct" because she had agreed to it (R.145). The
court found, however, that in the second interview, the victim "plainly described
sexual contact between herself and the Defendant, whom she eventually, albeit
reluctantly, described" (id.). Consequently, the court found that neither the DCFS
tapes nor Defendant's other arguments warranted withdrawal of the pleas (R. 139
&145-44). See also Addendum C.
Defense counsel moved to continue sentencing (R. 149: R253: 4). Counsel
complained that the PSR and Dr. Fox's psychosexual evaluation were "flawed"
6

because they considered Defendant's sexual involvement with the victim and other
aspects of his sexual history, even though the rape charges had been dismissed
(R253: 3-4). The court noted that the PSR "raises as many questions [about
Defendant]... as it answers" and ordered a more detailed assessment of Defendant
at the 90-day diagnostic unit at the state prison (R253:4). Defense counsel did not
object, but asked if the defense could procure an independent psychosexual
evaluation (id.). The court said the defense could gather whatever additional
information it wished during the 90 days Defendant was at the unit (R253: 7-8).
Sentencing was set for March 2007 (id.).
One month later, in January 2007, the court informed the parties that
Defendant refused to cooperate with the diagnostic unit and that the unit believed
"further evaluation would [not] be beneficial" (R254: 3). The court ordered
Defendant transferred back to jail and moved sentencing up to February (R254:4-5).
Defense counsel did not object, except to ask if Defendant could be released on bail
(R254:3-5). The court refused because it was "not convinced that [Defendant's], that
he's, safe in the community"(R254: 5).
On February 15,2007, Defendant was sentenced (R255:12). Defense counsel
asked that the two felonies be treated as one and Defendant placed on probation
(R255: 5). Defense counsel explained that Defendant's refusal to cooperate at the
diagnostic unit was at counsel's direction (R255:8). The court asked why an "officer
7

of the court" would direct a client not to cooperate (R255: 8-9). Defense counsel
explained that he did not want Defendant to incriminate himself by admitting to
other offenses. Defense counsel complained that the unit tried to "brainwash"
Defendant into admitting he had a sexual problem and was a sexual predator, but
that it was the fourteen-year-old victim who was "the instigator" (R255: 9-10).
Defense counsel characterized Fox's psychosexual evaluation as "total
misrepresentations, total bias, total one-sidedness" (R255: 11). When Defendant
addressed the court, he said simply: "I realize that what I did was wrong, I
shouldn't have allowed it to happen" (id.).
The court found that Defendant was not "safe to be released to the
community" and sentenced him to concurrent terms of zero-to-five years
imprisonment (R255:12).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Fourteen-year-old C. W. believed that there was nothing wrong in having sex
with nineteen-year-old Defendant and for months, they did (R. 15-14; R115: 7).
C.W/s stepfather became suspicious, searched C.W/s room, and found her
digital camera (R. 14). In it, he discovered photographs of Defendant, posing in the
nude and holding his "turgid penis" (R. 14). See also R115: 7-8. The stepfather
contacted the police and gave them the camera (R.14).

8

A DCFS social worker interviewed C.W. (R. 15). C.W. agreed that she was
having sex with an older boyfriend, but refused to name him and denied it was
Defendant (R. 15-14). A few days later, a police detective interviewed C.W. (R. 14).
Reluctantly, C.W. identified Defendant as her boyfriend, admitted they had had
sexual intercourse at least 15 times, and disclosed that Defendant had asked her to
photograph him (R. 14). See also R101 (Interviews).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant asserts multiple reasons why the trial court erred, but his seven
issues are really two: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the motion
to withdraw Defendant's guilty pleas? And did the court abuse its discretion in
ordering diagnostic evaluations of Defendant before sentencing him? The answer to
both questions is no.
This Court need not address the merits, however, because Defendant fails to
properly marshal the facts that support the trial court's rulings. Alternatively, the
trial court properly denied the motion to withdraw. The court correctly found that
the DCFS tapes contained no new or pivotal evidence and did not support
Defendant's allegation that the victim would have refused to testify. The court
further found that Defendant's pleas were fully supported by the facts and were not
conditioned upon a promise of no prison.

9

Defendant's other claims involving the presentence diagnostic evaluations are
not preserved and have no bearing on the validity of his guilty pleas. Consequently,
their merits should not be considered in reviewing the denial of the motion to
withdraw. Alternatively, to the extent these claims challenge Defendant's sentence,
they are also largely unpreserved and, in any case, lack merit. The court
appropriately gathered information about Defendant from multiple sources before
exercising its discretion and sentencing him to prison.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO
WITHDRAW DEFENDANTS KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY
GUILTY PLEAS
Defendant asserts that his convictions are " totally unfair" because "nothing
[he] has done is worthy of his being a convicted felon for having been briefly
photographed by a minor on his premises in his bed and bedroom/' Br.Aplt at 43.
Defendant claims he should be "exonerated for the State's persistent disregard of
due process, both procedural and substantive." Id. at 44. At the same time, he
concedes that when he pled guilty, he admitted that he had a prolonged sexual
relationship with the fourteen-year-old victim and asked her to photograph him as
he posed nude with his turgid penis exposed. Id. at 26-27.

10

Nevertheless, he asserts that that his guilty pleas should be vacated because:
(1) he received only a police summary of the victim's interviews, not the actual
tapes, before he pled guilty; (2) the prosecutor allegedly agreed not to recommend
prison, but Defendant was sentenced to prison; (3) the facts Defendant admitted do
not constitute a crime; (4) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order a psychosexual
examination; (5) the use of a penile plethysmograph "for any purpose" is
unconstitutional; (6) the 90-day diagnostic unit is unconstitutional; and a general
catch-all claim that (7) Defendant's procedural and substantive due process rights
were Id. at 3-4.
The Court need not address the merits of Defendant's claims, because he fails
to marshal the facts supporting the trial court's ruling. See State v. Chavez-Espinoza,
2008 UT App 191, If 20,186 P.3d 1023 (reaffirming that when an appellant fails to
marshal the facts, as required by rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
appellate court may refuse to consider the merits and summarily affirm).
Alternatively, the trial court properly denied the motion to withdraw.
This Court also need not consider the merits of claims not raised in the motion
to withdraw and not relevant to the validity of the pleas—such as Defendant's
presentence diagnostic challenges. Alternatively, to the extent these claims are an
attack of Defendant's sentence, they are likewise not preserved and/or lack merit.

11

A. Defendant's challenge to his guilty pleas is limited to the issues
raised in the motion to withdraw that relate to the knowing and
voluntary nature of the pleas.
Though Defendant argues seven grounds to vacate his pleas, only those
arguments that were raised in his motion to withdraw and that negate the knowing
and voluntary nature of his pleas should be considered.
In 2003, Utah narrowed the basis upon which a guilty plea may be
withdrawn. Whereas before, a plea could be withdrawn for "good cause," Utah law
now permits a guilty plea to be withdrawn only upon "a showing that it was not
knowingly and voluntarily made/' Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West Supp.
2008). This is a constitutional standard. Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988,992 (Utah
1993) (recognizing that whether a plea is knowing and voluntary is a constitutional
determination). This constitutional standard, unlike the former "good cause"
standard, does not require that a guilty plea strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Compare Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992 (holding that "a failure to
comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a guilty plea does not" render a plea
unknowing or involuntary), with State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah App.
1994) (applying pre-2003 Utah law to hold that failure to comply with rule 11
constitutes "good cause" to withdraw a guilty plea). Nevertheless, when a guilty
plea is entered in compliance with rule 11, the plea is presumed to be knowing and
voluntary. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT12, | 22, 26 P.3d 203.
12

Entry of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea "waives all non-jurisdictional
challenges to a conviction... includ[ing] pre-plea constitutional violations/' Medel
v. State, 2008 UT 32, If 26, 184 P.3d 1226 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Consequently, once a plea is entered, the "only avenue" to challenge the
conviction is to move the trial court to vacate the plea because it is not knowing and
voluntary. Id. See also Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6(2). And on appeal, only
those grounds properly preserved in the motion to withdraw should be considered,
unless plain error or exceptional circumstances are established. State v. Dean, 2004
UT 63, f 13,95 P.3d 276.
Here, Defendant ignores these requirements and limitations. For the first
time on appeal, he challenges the constitutionality of the diagnostic assessments and
the authority of the court to order these assessments. See Br.Aplt. at 35-38. Because
these issues were not raised in the motion to withdraw, they are not preserved and
should not be considered as grounds to vacate Defendant's plea. Instead, these
issues are relevant, if at all, only to Defendant's sentence.
Similarly, Defendant is precluded from arguing pre-plea discovery violations,
including constitutional violations, as a basis to withdraw his pleas unless he
establishes that those violations negated the knowing and voluntary nature of his
pleas. See Medel, 2008 UT 32, | f 26 & 35. The trial court correctly recognized this

13

limitation and considered the DCFS tapes only in the context of the knowing and
voluntary nature of Defendant's pleas (R. 145-44). See also Add. C.
In sum, the only challenges to the pleas that are properly before this Court
are: (1) whether delay in receiving the DCFS tape impacted the knowing nature of
Defendant's pleas, (2) whether there is a factual basis to support the pleas, and (3)
whether the pleas were conditioned upon a promise of no prison.
B. Defendant's challenge to his pleas should be summarily rejected
because he fails to marshal the facts supporting the trial courf s
denial of the motion to withdraw.
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires Defendant to
gather and recite "every scrap of competent evidence" that supports the trial court's
factual findings and ruling he challenges and "demonstrate how the [trial] court
found the facts from the evidence and then explain why those findings contradict
the clear weight of the evidence." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower
Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f If 26 & 39,140 P.3d 1200 (citing Chen v. Stewart, 2004
UT 82, f f 76, 11, 100 P.3d 1177). To meet this requirement, Defendant must
"temporarily remove [his] own prejudices" and "fully embrace the [State's]
position" to demonstrate why, despite the evidence that supports the ruling and
findings, the trial court nevertheless erred. United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35,
f 26. Defendant's failure to comply with the marshaling requirement permits this
Court to summarily reject his claims. See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, f 7.
14

At no point in his brief, does Defendant properly marshal the facts supporting
the findings he challenges. For example, Defendant alleges that when he received
the DCFS tapes after the entry of his pleas, he "learned for the first time that [the
fourteen-year-old victim] took full responsibility for initiating the relationship,
refused to identify him until forced by the police in the absence of counsel, and
would most likely, not have testified against the defendant/7 BrAplt at 20. After
reviewing the DCFS tapes, the trial rejected this interpretation of the facts and found
that the victim, "at best/' was reluctant to identify Defendant (R. 145). The court
found that while the minor victim felt responsible because she factually, but not
legally, consented to the illegal conduct, she ultimately and truthfully named
Defendant and described their sexual relationship (id.). Rather than marshaling the
facts supporting these findings, Defendant largely ignores them and repeats his trial
arguments. BrAplt at 19-29. Moreover, Defendant's claim that the police "forced"
the victim to identity Defendant has no record support. 4 A review of the interviews
reveals that the social worker and the police detective were professional and polite
at all times and interested only in the welfare of the minor victim. See R. 245
(Interviews).
4

The court did not address this claim because it correctly opined that even if,
hypothetically, the victim's rights were violated, this provided no basis to vacate
Defendant's knowing and voluntary guilty pleas (R.144 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978)).
15

Defendant also alleges that his plea is "null and void" because it was
conditioned upon a promise of no prison. BrAplt. at 22-24. The court found,
however, that the pleas were not conditioned on a promise regarding Defendant's
sentence and that he was warned he could be imprisoned up to five years on each
count (R. 140-39). Defendant not only ignores this finding, he goes further. In
disregard of the record, he claims the prosecutor advocated that a prison sentence
be imposed, when the prosecutor did not. Compare BrAplt at 23, with R115: 7.
Similarly, Defendant claims there is no factual basis to support the pleas
because he did not direct the victim to take the photographs and the photographs
do not depict him in a state of arousal. BrAplt at 15,29 & 32. The court found that
Defendant's admissions at the time of the plea negated this claim (R. 141). When
Defendant pled, he agreed that he "had [the victim] take pictures of himself while
sexually aroused and .. . those pictures are pornographic in nature" (R. 115: 7-8).
The photographs themselves support the trial court's finding.

See R. 245

(Photographs). Yet, Defendant ignores the court's finding and the physical evidence
to argue an unsupported version of the facts.
In sum, Defendant's failures to properly marshal alone justify summary
affirmance of the trial court's ruling. Chen, 2004 UT 82 at \ 3; Chavez-Espinoza, 2008
UT App 191 at \ 7. Alternatively, the trial court's findings are supported by the
record and justify the denial of the motion to withdraw.
16

C

The trial court correctly found that the DCFS tapes did not impact
the validity of Defendant's pleas.
In total disregard of the marshaled facts and trial court's findings, Defendant

claims that his pleas should be vacated because the prosecutor withheld exculpatory
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). He charges that the
prosecutor deliberately misled him into pleading guilty even though the State "had
no case" against him. See BrAplt. at 19-22. Defendant asserts that only after he pled
guilty and received a copy of the DCFS interviews, did he realize that the fourteenyear-old victim "took full responsibility for initiating the relationship, refused to
identify him until forced by the police in the absence of counsel, and would most
likely, not have testified against the defendant." BrAplt at 20. The claim lacks
merit.
Defendant presents this argument as a Brady violation. BrAplt at 19-21. It is
not. A guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional pre-plea discovery violations,
including Brady violations. Medel, 2008 UT 32, I f 26-27. Instead, as the trial court
recognized, an allegation of a pre-plea discovery violation is only relevant to the
extent that it negates the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea. Id. See also State
v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1278 (Utah 1989); Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, | 31,165
P.3d 1195. This requires that the suppressed evidence support more than an

17

affirmative defense or impeachment; it must support factual innocence. Medel, 2008
UT 32,^27.
Here, the trial court reviewed that DCFS tapes and found that they contained
no "new or pivotal" information that was not otherwise disclosed in discovery (R.
145-44). The finding was correct. Months before Defendant pled, the prosecutor
provided the defense with a summary of the DCFS interviews, which summary
indicated that the victim was reluctant to name Defendant and did not want to get
him into trouble (R257:12).
The court also found that the DCFS tapes provided no basis to believe that the
victim had "an inability or refusal to testify" (R145). Instead, the court found that
though reluctant to name Defendant, the victim "plainly described sexual contact
between herself and Defendant" (id.). A review of those interviews fully supports
the finding. See R. 245 (Interview DVD & Transcript).5
Defendant also claimed that victim would not hav e testified based on what he
alleges was her failure to appear for three and one-half hours on the day of the
scheduled preliminary hearing. Br.Aplt at 12 & 21. Below, Defendant claimed that
his counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss when the victim did not

5

Moreover, the victim's testimony was not critical to the conviction of dealing
in material harmful to a minor because the nude photographs of Defendant on the
victim's camera could speak for themselves.
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appear (R. 99-98 & 143). The court accepted Defendant's representation that the
victim was late, but found no prejudice because the charges, even if dismissed,
could have been re-filed (R. 143).6
On appeal, Defendant abandons his claim of ineffectiveness, but nevertheless
attacks the trial court's finding as speculation. Br.Aplt. at |21. Defendant fails to
acknowledge, however, that the record does not support his initial premise that the
victim failed to appropriately appear at the scheduled preliminary hearing. The
marshaled facts establish that at the time of the scheduled hearing and before
Defendant pled, the prosecutor informed the court that the victims' parents were in
the courtroom and that the minor victim was in the courthouse (R115: 3). The
prosecutor represented that she had discussed the proposed disposition with the
victim and her parents (id.). Defendant then entered his ple^s (R115: 7). After the
pleas were entered, the victim apparently appeared in th$ courtroom with her
mother (R. 109). These facts establish only that the fourteeifL-y ear-old victim, like
many victims, chose not to be in the courtroom until she was| either called to testify
or Defendant pled guilty.

6

The prosecutor who responded to Defendant's motion, but who had no
personal knowledge of what transpired on the day of the [preliminary hearing,
likewise accepted Defendant's assertion as true, but argued i{ made no difference to
the validity of the pleas (R257:12-13).
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In addition to Defendant's failure to acknowledge record facts that support
the trial court ruling, he also fails to cite contrary Utah case law. Indeed, he cites no
Utah case law. Here, the trial court's finding that delayed disclosure of the DCFS
tapes did not undermine ihe validity of Defendant's pleas is fully supported by
Medel, 2008 UT 32.
Medel was charged with sexual assault and provided with some, but not all,
discovery before he pled guilty. Medel, 2008 UT 32, f f 3-5. Later, he discovered
that he had not received a psychological report, which Medel claimed would have
supported a diminished capacity defense. Id. at f 11. He alleged that his conviction
should be vacated because the prosecutor deliberately withheld the exculpatory
evidence to induce him to plead guilty. Id. at Iff 8-10.
In rejecting Medel's claim, the Utah Supreme Court held that "in order for a
guilty plea to be rendered involuntary based on the prosecution's failure to disclose
evidence, a [defendant] must establish that the evidence withheld by the
prosecution was material exculpatory evidence." Id. at f 33. The court further
defined this to mean that, based on the totality of the record, the withheld
information supported factual innocence. Id. at f f 27 & 35.
Here, Defendant does not claim that the DCFS tapes established his factual
innocence. Instead, he claims that if he would not have pled guilty, if he had known
that the fourteen-year-old victim "took full responsibility for initiating the
20

relationship" and "most likely" would not testify against him. BrAplt at 20-21.
Moreover, his claim that he was wrongfully convicted is not based on the facts, but
on his view of what the law should be, not on the law as it exists. See BrAplt at 42
(arguing that consensual sex between adults and minors should be lawful).
In any case, the trial court correctly found the DCFS tapes did not contain new
or pivotal information that was not otherwise available at the time of pleas (R. 144).
This alone negates Defendant's claim that information was withheld. In sum,
Defendant fails to establish that the trial courts factual findings concerning the
DCFS tapes are erroneous.
D. The trial court correctly found that a factual basis supported the
pleas.
The crime of dealing in material harmful to a minor is committed when a
defendant "intentionally presents or directs any performance before a minor that is
harmful to a minor" or "intentionally participates in any performance, before a
minor, that is harmful to a minor." Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-1206(1) (Add. A.)
Here, it is uncontested that Defendant knew the victim was a minor.
Material is harmful to a minor when it depicts nudity and sexual excitement
and meets other criteria:
"Harmful to minors" means that quality of a n y . . . representation, in
whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement . . .
when it[,] taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of
minors; is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult
21

community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for
minors; and taken as a whole, does not have serious value for minors.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201(4) (West 2004) (numbers and paragraphing omitted)
(Add. A).
Defendant admitted the following facts when he plead guilty:
(1) As a nineteen-year-old, he had sexual intercourse with the fourteenyear-old victim numerous times over four months;
(2) As part of that sexual relationship, he asked the victim to take
pictures of him while he was sexually aroused;
(3) Those pictures were "pornographic" in the context of a minor, in
that they depicted him posing nude holding his turgid penis;
(4) The victim not only took the photographs, but also viewed them.
(R115: 7-8). Nevertheless, Defendant claims that, as a matter of law, these facts do
not establish the offense of dealing in material harmful to a minor because the
photographs were not "patently offensive" under the standard established in Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Br.Aplt at 29. He also argues that the photographs
could not have offended this victim because she was already sexually active. Br.Aplt
at 28. Furthermore, he claims the victim did not see the photographs, that the
photographs were for his and her own pleasure, and that no "performance" was
involved. Br.Aplt at 27-29. The trial court properly rejected these arguments and
correctly found that a factual basis supported the pleas (R. 143-41). See Add. C.
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The court correctly ruled that Mille/s obscenity standard governing adults
does not apply to section 76-10-1206 that protects minors (R. 142-41). Instead, the
definition of "harmful to minors" found in section 76-10-1201(4) applies (id.). See
also State v. Burke, 675 P.2d 1198,1200 (Utah 1984) (holding the statutory definition
constitutional in the context of minors). Here, Defendant, an adult, admitted that he
directed a fourteen-year-old girl to photograph him as he posed in the nude holding
his turgid penis (R. 141). The trial court correctly found this sufficient to support the
pleas (id.).
The trial court also properly rejected Defendant's claims that he did not
knowingly pose for the photographs or direct the victim to take them (R. 141). The
victim's statements and the photographs themselves fully support this finding (R.
15-14; R115: 7-8). Moreover, in pleading guilty, Defendant admitted that he asked
the victim to photograph him while he was sexually aroused (R115: 7-8). His
admission at that time that the photographs were "pornographic" also supports the
court's finding. For pornography is not a legal standard, but a sexual term that
includes depictions of lewdness or "other erotic behavior designed to cause sexual
excitement." Miller, 413 U.S. at 18 n.2. Here, the use of the term in the plea hearing
accurately describes the contents of the photographs as well as Defendant's purpose
in having the victim take them, to sexually arouse the fourteen-year-old. Clearly,
such photographs are "patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult
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community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors/ 7 See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201(4)(b).
In rejecting Defendant's claim, the trial court also recognized that though the
issue was framed as a legal question, Defendant was really challenging the facts (R.
143-41). The court found this inappropriate in that in pleading guilty Defendant
admitted those facts and waived his right to require their proof (id.).
In sum, Defendant's appellate argument has little to do with the requirements
of existing law. Rather, he opines that fourteen-year-olds should not be protected
from sexual predators and sexual materials. See Br.Aplt at 39-43. The Utah
Legislature does not share his view.
E. The trial court correctly found that the pleas were not conditioned
upon a promise of no prison.
Defendant contends that his pleas are "null and void" because they were
conditioned upon a promise of no prison, yet he was sentenced to prison. Br.Aplt. at
22-23. The claim has no merit.
In denying the motion to withdraw, the trial court found that Defendant's
pleas were conditioned only upon the dismissal of the rape charges and a referral to
Adult Probation & Parole for a presentence report and recommendation (R. 140-39).
Both conditions were met. The court also found that Defendant understood that
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there were no promises regarding his sentence and recommendations of the
prosecutor or the probation department were not binding on the court (R. 140).
Nevertheless, Defendant suggests that the plea agreement also included a
"promise" by the prosecutor not to recommend prison and that the prosecutor
"betrayed" him by advocating for a prison term at sentencing. Br.Aplt. at 23. The
record does not support the claim. Moreover, Defendant never argued below that
the prosecutor breached the plea agreement.
Anthony Rippa represented defendant when he pled (R. 115). Thomas Burton
represented him when he was sentenced (R. 255). At the sentencing hearing,
defense counsel Burton expressed his belief that "the agreement with my
predecessor counsel was that there would be no recommended a, prison time at all,
and I believe it was that there would be no statement [by the prosecutor] in regard
to jail" (R255: 4-5). The court interjected that it had already found that the written
plea agreement contained no restriction on the prosecutor's recommendations
(R255: 6). The prosecutor then explained that in fact, she had told Mr. Rippa that
she would not recommend a prison term, but that she had made no representations
to him concerning jail time and felt free to support a jail sentence as recommended
in the PSR (id.). Defense counsel did not contest the prosecutor's recollection of her
conversation with Mr. Rippa or claim that this conversation was a condition of the
plea agreement.
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The prosecutor then related that the victim's family had written a letter
expressing their desire that Defendant be imprisoned (R255:7). However, the PSR,
done in March 2006 before the aborted 90-day diagnostic referral, recommended
probation conditioned upon a year in jail and completion of sexual-offender therapy
(R. 101). The prosecutor made no sentence recommendation, but asked that if the
PSR recommendation was followed, Defendant be restricted from any association
with minors as a term of his probation (R255: 7). The court chose not to follow the
PSR's recommendation and sentenced Defendant to prison (R255:12).
Based on these facts, there was no violation of the plea agreement.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION
IN ORDERING PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS OF
DEFENDANT BEFORE SENTENCING HIM
Defendant asserts the trial court should not have ordered psychosexual or
diagnostic evaluations because he did not plead guilty to a sex crime. Br.Aplt at
30-31. He also argues that the use of a penile plethysinograph in the psychosexual
evaluation was unconstitutional.

Br.Aplt at 31-35. And he claims that the

conditions of his confinement at the 90-day diagnostic unit violated his right to
privacy and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments. Id. at 35 & 37-38. These arguments are unpreserved, not properly
raised on appeal, and meritless.
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A. The trial court properly ordered diagnostic assessments of
Defendant.
As a general rule, "a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific
preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial record before an
appellate court will review such claim on appeal/' State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,551
(Utah 1987). "The objection must be specific enough to give the trial court notice of
the very error of which counsel complains/' State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,546 (Utah
App. 1998) (quotations and citation omitted). Underlying this requirement is the
recognition that the trial court should be granted an "opportunity to correct [its
own] errors/' State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993) (quotations and
citation omitted).
Here, Defendant failed to object to the psychosexual evaluation or the
plethysmograph, except to claim that the evaluation was flawed and biased (R253: 3
& 6). When the court first ordered a psychosexual evaluation as part of the
presentence investigation, Defendant did not object (R115: 8-10). Months after the
evaluation and PSR were completed, Defendant claimed they were biased and
sought to have a second psychosexual evaluation performed by a doctor of his own
choosing (R253: 6). In doing so, Defendant did not argue that the court had no
authority to order an evaluation or that use of a plethysmograph was
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unconstitutional (id.). Consequently, the issues are waived. Alternatively, the
claims have no merit.
A trial court has discretion "to determine whether it has sufficient information
to impose sentence/'

State v. Thorkelson, 84 P.3d 8!54, 857 (Utah App. 2004).

Moreover, ordering a psychological or other evaluation of a defendant is "clearly
discretionary with the trial court/' State v. Gerrand, 584 P.2d 885,886 (Utah 1978).
And while there is "some dispute in the scientific community as to the use of the
penile plethysmograph for diagnostic purposes," this is so only because the test may
result in "a large number of false negatives—passing as normal persons who are
actually pedophiles." Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496,499 n.6 (Utah 1998).
In this case, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to order a
psychosexual evaluation because the charges Defendant plead to and the sexual
conduct he admitted to involved a fourteen-year-old (R115: 8). The fact that the
evaluation also included a penile plethysmograph does not disturb this discretion.
Cf. Parker, 971 P.2d at 499 n.6 (characterizing the test as "extremely intrusive" and
embarrassing, but "diagnostically appropriate"). This is especially true where
Defendant opines that claims of "deviant sexual arousal patterns are laughable" in
that they do "not take into account new sexual aggression of females engendered by
the feminist movement's emphasis on sexual liberation regardless of age" and
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because "Cosmopolitan magazine is the bible of many young women, even minors."
BrAplt at 33.
Next, Defendant attacks the constitutionality of the 90-^day diagnostic unit by
claiming that his constitutional rights were violated by the conditions in the unit.
BrAplt at 35-38 (asserting that the unit does not provide sufficient recreation,
visitation, or television time and that it provides no legitimate treatment).
Defendant raised these arguments below only when the court notified him that the
90-day referral was being prematurely terminated because Defendant refused to
cooperate (R254:3-5). Then and now, Defendant claims that the unit attempted to
brainwash him into admitting he was a sexual predatory just as the juvenile
authorities attempted to do when he was in their custody (R256: 9-11). See also
BrAplt at 35-36. And when the court questioned why defense counsel told
Defendant not to cooperate, counsel attempted to justify |iis actions by further
attacking the unit's policies (R255: 8-11). But by that time|, the issue was moot.
Defendant was not in the unit and the unit completed no evaluation of defendant.
Thus, the conditions of confinement in the unit had no bearing on Defendant's
sentence.
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B. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing
Defendant to prison.
Defendant infers that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to
prison. Br.Aplt. at 43. The claim lacks merit.
A trial court may impose any sentence within the boundaries set by the
legislature. State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, Tf 9,110 P.3d 149; State v. Rhodes, 818
P.2d 1048,1051 (Utah App. 1991). That "decision will not be overturned 'unless it
exceeds statutory or constitutional limits, the judge failed to consider all the legally
relevant factors, or the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute
abuse of discretion/" State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, 1 59,191 P.3d 17.
Here, Defendant does not allege that imposition of two concurrent terms of
zero-to-five years imprisonment for two third-degree felony convictions exceeds the
statutory or constitutional limits. Nor does he claim that the court failed to consider
all legally relevant facts. Instead, he suggests merely that sentencing him to prison
was unfair because, despite what the law says, his violations were minimal. See
Br.Aplt. at 42-43.
The potential of a prison sentence was explained to Defendant when he
entered his guilty pleas (R. 42; R115:3). Nevertheless, he chose to risk that outcome
in return for the dismissal of two counts of rape (R. 32; R115:9). In other words, he
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traded the risk of being imprisoned for life for the risk of being imprisoned for five
years.
Nor can it be claimed that it was "inherently unfair" for the court to impose a
prison sentence where Defendant had failed to benefit from ^ex-offender treatment
in the past and, in the opinion of the court, posed a threat to the community if
released (R115: 12). See also R. 101 (PSR). And whilei the PSR had earlier
recommended probation and the prosecutor did not oppose Ithat recommendation,
the court was not bound by the 2006 recommendation, especially where it did not
reflect Defendant's attitude in 2007 towards treatment. See State v. Thurston, 781
P.2d 1296,1301 (Utah App. 1989) (recognizing that a court is never bound by a
recommendation). In sum, the trial court had no "realistic alternatives" to prison
(R255:12).
CONCLUSION
Defendant's convictions and sentence should be affintned.
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Addenda

Addendum A

PART 12. PORNOGRAPHIC AND HARMFUL
MATERIALS AND PERFORMANCES
§ 7 6 - 1 0 - 1 2 0 1 . Definitions
For the purpose of this part:
(1) "Contemporary community standards" means those current standards in
the vicinage where an offense alleged under this act has occurred, is occurring,
or will occur.
(2) "Distribute" means to transfer possession of materials Whether with or
without consideration.
(3) "Exhibit" means to show.
(4) "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, in whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or
sadomasochistic abuse when it:
(a) taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors;
(b) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as
a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; ai|id
(c) taken as a whole, does not have serious value for minors. Serious
value includes only serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for
minors.
(5) "Knowingly" means an awareness, whether actual or constructive, of the
character of material or of a performance. A person has constructive knowledge if a reasonable inspection or observation under the circumstances would
have disclosed the nature of the subject matter and if a failure to inspect or
observe is either for the purpose of avoiding the disclosure or is criminally
negligent
(6) "Material" means anything printed or written or any picture, drawing,
photograph, motion picture, or pictorial representation, or any statue or other
figure, or any recording or transcription, or any mechanical, chemical, or
electrical reproduction, or anything which is or may be used ^s a means of
communication. Material includes undeveloped photographs, n}olds, printing
plates, and other latent representational objects.
(7) "Minor" means any person less than eighteen years of age.
(8) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic
area, or buttocks, with less than an opaque covering, or the showing of a female
breast with less than an opaque covering, or any portion thereof below the top
of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid
state.
(9) "Performance" means any physical human bodily activity^ whether engaged in alone or with other persons, including but not limited to singing,
speaking, dancing, acting, simulating, or pantomiming.
(10) "Public place" includes a place to which admission is gjained by payment of a membership or admission fee, however designated, notwithstanding
its being designated a private club or by words of like import
(11) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by or upon a
person who is nude or clad in undergarments, a mask, or in a revealing or
bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound, or otherwise
physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.

(12) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or
any touching of a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks,
or, if the person is a female, breast, whether alone or between members of the
same or opposite sex or between humans and animals in an act of apparent or
actual sexual stimulation or gratification.
(13) "Sexual excitement" means a condition of human male or female
genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal, or the sensual
experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or nudity.
Laws 1975, c. 49, § 3; Laws 1977, c. 92, § 3; Laws 2001, c. 9, § 116, effi April 30,
2001.

§ 7 6 - 1 0 - 1 2 0 6 . Dealing in material harmful to a minor
(1) A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when,
knowing that a person is a minor, or having failed to exercise reasonable care
in ascertaining the proper age of a minor, he:
(a) intentionally distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to
exhibit to a minor any material harmful to minors;
(b) intentionally produces, presents, or directs any performance before a
minor, that is harmful to minors; or
(c) intentionally participates in any performance before a minor, that is
harmful to minors.
(2) Each separate offense under this section is a third degree felony punishable by a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $300 plus $10 for each
article exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law and by incarceration,
without suspension of sentence in any way, for a term of not less than 14 days.
This section supersedes Section 77-18-1.
(3) If a defendant has already been convicted once under this section, each
separate further offense is a second degree felony punishable by a minimum
mandatory fine of not less than $5,000 plus $10 for each article exhibited up to
the maximum allowed by law and by incarceration, without suspension of
sentence in any way, for a term of not less than one year. This section
supersedes Section 77-18-1.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-10-1206; Laws 1975, c. 49, § 6; Laws 1989, c. 187, § 8; Laws
1990, c. 163, §§ 10, 11; Laws 1997, c. 164, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2000, c. 53, § 1,
eff. May 1, 2000.

§ 77-13-6.

Withdrawal of plea

(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time pnpr to conviction.
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea
held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced.
Sentence may not be annoimced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held
in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be madt within 30 days of
pleading guilty or no contest
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified
in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Tide 78, Chapter 35a, PostConviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules 0f Civil Procedure.
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 65, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 16, § U Laws 2003, c. 290,
§ 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 90, § 91, eff. May 3, 2004.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on January 18, 2006)

3

THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Daniel Steven White.

4

Anthony Rippa is here in behalf of the defendant who is

5

present.

6

No. 051404350.

7

State is represented by Donna Kelly.

It's case

Status, please.

MS. KELLY: Your Honor, we've reached a resolution in

8

this case; and the resolution is that the defendant will plead

9

guilty as charged to Counts III and IV, third-degree felonies.

10
11
12

State will move to dismiss Counts I and II.
THE COURT: Mr. White, have you had an opportunity to
discuss the matters with your legal Counsel?

13

MR. WHITE: Yes, I have.

14

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with that discussion?

15

MR. WHITE: Yes.

16

THE COURT: Do you need any additional time to consult

17

with Mr. Rippa before you proceed further?

18

MR. WHITE: No, sir.

19

THE COURT: Are you free from the influence of alcohol

20

and drugs today?

21

MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

22

THE COURT: Are you being treated for any type of

23

mental illness whatsoever?

24

MR. WHITE: (No verbal response).

25

THE COURT: Is it fair to say that you proceeding

~3~
1

voluntarily, sir?

2

MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

3

THE COURT: Let's make sure you understand these

4

charges. Count III, dealing in harmful material to a minor.

5

I need to inquire of the State of Utah whether or not you

6

visited with the victims or victims' families relative to this

7

resolution?

8
9

MS. KELLY: Yes, I have, your Honor. iThe victim's
father and mother are here.

I have talked wit|h them about the

10

resolution.

The victim is also here.

11

courtroom, but she's in the courthouse.

She's npt present in the

12

THE COURT: Okay.

13

MS. KELLY: I've spoken with her about the resolution.

14
15

They are in agreement with it.
THE COURT: Okay.

Count III is dealing in harmful

16

material to a minor, a third-degree felony.

17

felony is punishable by incarceration in the Ut^ah State

18

Prison for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed five

19

years, together with a fine up to $5,000 and/ori both.

20

understand that, sir?

21

MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

22

THE COURT: Okay.

A third-degree

Do you

It alleges that you, on or about or

23

between June 1, 2005 and October 1, 2005 in Utah County, Utah,

24

knowing that a person was a minor, or having failed to exercise

25

reasonable care in ascertaining the proper age of a minor, did
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intentionally distribute or offer to distribute, exhibit or

2

offer to exhibit to a minor any material harmful to minors,

3

or intentionally produce, present or direct any performance

4

before a minor that was harmful to minors, or intentionally

5

participated in any performance before a minor that was harmful

6

to minors.

Do you understand that charge, sir?

7

MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

8

THE COURT: Are you prepared to enter a plea of guilty

9

to that charge because you are in fact guilty of the charge?

10

MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

11

THE COURT: Okay.

Going to Count IV is dealing in

12

harmful material to a minor, also a third-degree felony.

13

time —

This

let's see, it's the exact same charge?

14

MS. KELLY: Yes.

15

THE COURT: The same dates, the same degree, a third-

16

degree felony, the same provision from the Utah Code, with the

17

exact same language.

18

with harmful material to a minor, a third-degree felony?

Sir, do you understand Count IV, dealing

19

MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

20

THE COURT: Are you prepared to enter a plea of guilty

21

to that charge because you are in fact guilty of that charge?

22

MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

23

THE COURT: You have entered guilty pleas to Counts

24

III and Count IV as set forth.

You are waiving certain

25

Constitutional rights. Among those are your right to a speedy,
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public jury trial of your peers, and your right to appeal the

2

jury verdicts if they were against you.

3

that, sir?

Do you understand

4

MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

5

THE COURT: In addition, you would be waiving the

6

right you have to present a defense, call witnesses in your

7

own behalf at the cost of the State of Utah, and your right to

8

confront and cross examine witnesses or officers involved, your

9

accusers.

Do you understand that?

10

MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

11

THE COURT: You have a right to e fre^ from self-

12

incrimination.

If you enter guilty pleas, you would be

13

incriminating yourself and waiving that right.

14

understand that?

Do you

15

MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

16

THE COURT: Sir, there's a presumption of innocence

17

that attends you at all stages of these proceedings.

If you

18

enter guilty pleas, you are defeating that presumption of

19

innocence.

Do you understand that?

20

MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

21

THE COURT: Next, the State does have the burden to

22

prove all the elements of the charges beyond a reasonable

23

doubt.

24

State of any duty or obligation to present any evidence before

25

this Court or before a jury; do you understand that?

Should you enter guilty pleas, you are relieving the
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MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

2

THE COURT: Counsel, are you satisfied your client is

3

proceeding voluntarily, knowingly and with full understanding?

4

MR. RIPPA: I am, your Honor.

5

THE COURT: Do you know of any legal reason why he

6

ought not to enter guilty pleas to Count III and Count IV as

7

set forth?

8

MR. RIPPA: No, your Honor.

9

THE COURT: Okay.

Sir, you have before you a written

10

document, a statement in advance of plea.

11

opportunity to care fully read, review and appreciate that

12

document?

Have you had an

13

MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

14

THE COURT: Do you read and understand the English

15

language?

16

MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

17

THE COURT: You've had how much schooling?

18

MR. WHITE: Twelve years.

19

THE COURT: Okay.

Is there any word, phrase or

20 1 paragraph in that document that you do not understand?
21

MR. WHITE: No, sir.

22

THE COURT: Chooses to endorse the document in open

23
24
25

Court today, you may do so.
MR. RIPPA: I'm sorry, I already got him to sign it;
but if you'll just sign it again.
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THE COURT: Okay, and then present it to the Court.

2

MR. RIPPA: Just to it twice. That's fine.

3

THE COURT: I find that he's proceeding voluntarily,

4

knowingly and with full understanding, free ftom the influence

5

of alcohol and drugs, not being treated for atry type of mental

6

illness, has the benefit of capable legal Counsel. With those

7

findings, then this Court will endorse the same.

8

the file.

Place it in

Rely upon it specifically to supplement the Court's

I
9
10
11

colloquy.
Counsel, do you waive the reading, and may I take his
pleas by referring to the captions?

12

MR. RIPPA: That's fine, your Honor.

13

THE COURT: Okay.

Daniel Steven White, to Count III as

14

charged, dealing in harmful material to a minor, a third-degree

15

felony, what is your plea?

16

MR. WHITE: Guilty.

17

THE COURT: To Count IV, dealing in harmful material to

18

a minor, a third-degree felony, what is your plea?

19

MR. WHITE: Guilty.

20

THE COURT: Is there a factual basis t<f> support that?

21

MS. KELLY: Yes, your Honor.

Between June 1st of 2005

22

and October 1st of 2005 the defendant was engaged with —

23

sexual relationship with a 14-year-old girl in Highland, which

24

is in Utah County.

25

take pictures of himself while sexually arouseq, and they are

in a

As part of that relationship he had her
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pornographic —

those pictures are pornographic in nature.

2

THE COURT: Okay.

3

MS. KELLY: She not only took the pictures.

4

She also

saw them, viewed them.

5

THE COURT: Okay.

6

MS. KELLY: Exhibited them to her.

7

THE COURT: Is that what happened on those occasions,

8

sir?

9

MR. WHITE: Yes, sir.

10

THE COURT: I find there is a factual basis to support

11

the entry of guilty pleas to Count III and IV.

12

then, to dismiss Count I and II?

13

MS. KELLY: Yes, your Honor.

14

THE COURT: I'll grant your motion.

State's motion,

I'm going to refer

15

the matter to Adult Probation and Parole for a pre-sentence

16

investigative report.

17

dealing with a 14-year-old girl, we also need a psycho-sexual

18

report.

I think in light of the fact that we're

19

MS. KELLY: We would agree with that.

20

THE COURT: And so instead of just 45 days from today,

21

we would set sentencing approximately 60 days from today. Now,

22

you're entitled to be sentenced not less than 2 days or more

23

than 45 days from today; but the Court does need a psycho-

24

sexual evaluation, and so does the —

25

and Parole, to see whether you are a predator as it relates to

so does Adult Probation
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young girls within our community, and whether you pose a

2

significant risk as it relates to young victims within our

3

community.

4 I
5

Counsel, do you waive the time, and can we set it
about 60 days down the road?

6

(Counsel conferring with defendant off the record)

7

MR. RIPPA: Yeah, that's fine, your Honor.

8

THE COURT: Okay, letfs set it.

9

COURT CLERK: March 22nd, 9 a.m.

10

THE COURT: March 22nd, 9 a.m.

11

referral card.

12

Parole within 24 hours.

I'm going to give you a

I want you to get over to Adult Probation and

13

MR. RIPPA: Sorry, was that March 22nd^

14

COURT CLERK: Yes.

15

MR. RIPPA: Okay.

16

THE COURT: At 9 a.m.

Get over to Adult Probation

17

and Parole within 24 hours.

It's about two-and-a-half blocks

18

from here. Cooperate with them in the preparation of a pre-

19

sentence investigative report.

20

or treating evaluator there is as it relates to a psycho-sexual

21

evaluation, for the benefit of the Court and benefit of Adult

22

Probation and Parole.

Cooperate with whatever doctor

23

You have an ongoing obligation not to have any contact

24

with her in any form or fashion, directly, indirectly or in any

25

other way.

I will order that you not be in the presence or
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absent supervision with any minor girl, period, during the

2

pendency of this —

3
4

MR. RIPPA: Your Honor, would that extend to his
siblings?

5
6

THE COURT: Yeah, it extends to siblings.

If he's got,

you know, a 12 or 13 or 14-year-old sister, of course it would.

7
8

during the pendency of this matter.

MS. KELLY: So that means unsupervised contact; he
can't be alone —

9

THE COURT: Yes.

10

MS. KELLY: -- with —

11

MR. RIPPA: I understand.

12

THE COURT: Cannot be —

13

girl.

14

you a referral card.

15

for sentencing.

16

24 hours.

cannot be alone with any young

So that will be the order of this Court. We'll give
Step forward, sign a promise to appear

Get over to Adult Probation and Parole within

17

MS. KELLY: Thank you, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: We'll give you the referral card.

19
20

you very much.
(Hearing concluded)

Thank
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STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTD7ICATE OF COUNSEL
Case No .

vs.

pS-l1* g-4-gSo

Defendant
_, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have, been
n< I vised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:
LX*WIIC4

-b» . U j H-<

Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
Crime & Statutory
Provision

B.

n

Degree

Funis iunent
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
G-s
(3 - - £

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading guilty (or no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:

* I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes), I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty,
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest):v
.

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand

2

that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the
appointed lawyer's service to me.
I (have-not) £have) waived my right to counsel. ±i i nave waived my right to counsel,
I have done so knowingly, intelligently., and voluntarily for the following reasons:

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, myrights,and the consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
Jury TriaL I know that I have a rigiu to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will T.- : -• ng up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest),
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, I know that if I were to have
a jury trial, a) I would have therightto see and observe the witnesses who testified against
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses, 1 know that "if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses iff'chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and
li'i.l imony of-those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the
State would pay 'those costs. •
• '.Right to testify and/privilege against self-incrimination. !• .now that if I were to
' have a jury trial, I would have'the right to testify on E:> own behalf I also know that if I
chose not to testify, no brie could make me testify' or make me ^ive evidence against my > v; f
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hole ; y
refusal to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. 1 know thai u i ^ :,
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty . ^
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty,"
and my case will be set for a trial. A t a trial, the State would have the burden of pro v '£3

each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will.be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the/
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs forme. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term,fine,or
both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.

4

Plea bargain. My guilty (osao c ontesfop 1 ea(s)-(is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea
.bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney, 411 the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea-bargain, if .any, are fiilly contained in this statement, including those
explained below:

L

. rial judge not bound. I know-that any. charge or "sentencing concession i
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the -charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what ir.zy
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my ownfreewill and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful
influence of any kind have been made.to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). .No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement,.or I have had it ::;a* ;o -: ry my attorney, zrz
understand its. contents and adopt each.statement in it as my own, I know that Lam free
change or delete anything contained in this statement, tut I lo not wish to make any en a r
because all of the statements are correct
I am satis tied with the advice and assistance of my attorney
rU
I am ^<3years of age. I have attended school 'through tht [ ^
grade, I can, read
and "understand the English language. Ifl do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided* to me. I was not under the influence of any dings, medication, •- •• :oxicants
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under
the influence of an> drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
*ieve injsej. 10 ce
understanding these pdisease, defect, or im;
or from knowing7v r

:^iUig ilu

1 urn jrse ofM
uences of
at me fron, •. J . . w standing what I oin d.
y er/'Tir^my plea.
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before I have been sentenced and final
judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good
cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after sentence has been announced.
Dated this ^ ^

day of

20J3_V*

<J^\AA^QA

Certificate of Defense AttorneyI certify that I am the attorney for I ^ M I A £ , UWifc->
, the defendant
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and tiiese, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.

)R DEFENDANT

Bar No. f i f V*

6

C'eiiiflcnK MI i!i ii'ii riiiin"1 AMI iriii1 v
• T certifythat
thatI am the attorney" for the State of Utah In the case against,
^ defendant I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant
and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the
offense(s) is true and correct No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage,
a plea has been offered defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained in thd
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the
Court There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s)is7ar^ntered ami that&e acceptance
of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

PROSECUTING.

ZOKNEY

Bar No. 7 ^ 9 ^
^"\

7

Order
Based on the facts stt forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this

. day of.

**-

***£$$%&.

Addendum C

r?fc,&w

DEC 0 5 2006
4TH DlSTRldT/
STATE OF WHY
UTAH COUNTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTR1C I uURf,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

State o F 1

MUMWIUNMIM DECISION
Date: December 5,
^scN^O5140^cn

v s.
Daniel Steven White,

I Imli't.' funics \i

\\)\U\l'

!>• fond ant

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Withdra w <' mil y I," I" ,i
1 lie motion bus been I'i'i'iy briefed,, uid ;i hrm "iu» w s held 'n this Court on November 9, 2006.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is denied
i - evani factual Backgi QUI id
1 );initi Steven While '•' r • ^ri^d!*' c V ^ e d with two counts of rape (first degree
felonies) and two counts of dealing in material harmful to a mj'nor (third degree felonies
January IN, ,201)6, a pii'Imuiiuiy lieaiing ui IIns IMS*" v is si linlul' d Although, the victim
appeared three and a half hours late to the hearing. Before the witness arrived. Mi White waived
his right to a preliminary hearing and entered a gu,K> pi^u . ."
I

•

. . >• ^ .* malcinal

. were dismissed by the State. After obtaining new

counsel and prior to sentencing^ Mr White has filed a Motion to Withdraw his guilty plea to the
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two counts of dealing in material harmful to a minor.
Motion to Withdraw Plea
Mr. White claims that because of (1) prosecutorial misconduct (2) ineffective assistance
of counsel (3) an insufficient factual basis for dealing in harmful material to a minor under
U.C.A. § 76-10-1206 and (4) because he did not understand the plea agreement with the State,
the plea was not made voluntarily and knowingly. Accordingly, Mr. White asks the Court to
allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas.
A plea of guilty "may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it
was not knowingly and voluntarily made." U.C.A. § 77-13-6(a) (2006). This is a change from
the pre-2003 version, which gave the court broad discretion to allow the withdrawal of a guilty
plea for "good cause shown." Id. (2002). A motion to withdraw a guilty plea "shall be made by
motion before sentence is announced." U.C.A. § 77-13-6(b). Further, under Rule 11(e) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a Court may not accept a guilty plea until it has made specific
findings. Mr. White disputes that the Court made all of the necessary findings. Specifically, Mr.
White claims that the Court did not adequately find that:
(e)(2) the plea [was] voluntarily made;...
(e)(4)(A) the defendant [understood] the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is
entered...
(e)(7) if the tendered plea [was] a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so,
what agreement ha[d] been reached;
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 11. Additionally, "a plea's presumption of validity is strong,
and one who would set a plea aside has the burden of proving that there is a legal ground for
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doing so." State v.Thurston. 781 ?.2d 1296, UUI (I Uali i t . App. I ^Myjdulcinai ulalions
i111 in i tied).
Prosecutorial Misconduct
i lie ^ei.wrai ru^ .^ w.ai w.i^v.i.. ,

.

*

"

*>*i.

<x

1 nniwlrd^-e of that.evidence and defense counsel simply fails to request it." State v. Jarrell. 608
P.2d 218, 225 (Utah., 1980). Exculpatory evidence is "evidence tending to establish a criminal
defendant's innocence," iildck"s Livv Dictionary, 7s' --r.-.'.x

'

i.:- » .^ ier the former'version

of U.C.A. § 77-13-6, the Utah Supreme Court found that a t:\ai .-• ml should grant a motion to
*x1 draw when "new and iauspj:«.;}nj piv^ial evidence""" arises alia Hie « utiy ol (lit pled, Stale
v. ua, legos, ; **• '- *

''

::

* >

•' w ically Allows that if such evidence exists, a

guilt) nlea was not done "knowingly" under the new U.C.A. § 77-13-6.
ML White claims that theprosi'UiliH in llii1. » a:.c kcj11 VM iilp.itnit rimlnii r ('mm lnm 1m
failing to provide a video and transcript of a DCFS interview conducted with the • K-i-n. . h
Ifi

* } hite asserts that the interview reveals the victim,, would not testify against JV*
. - - ~ 'Cailu'

4J

.

*

.>

;_t

liib. Because of this, Mr.

te asks the Court u> ai: ^ h;m ;o withdraw his plea.
. n!.^ vi:i; has reviewed the liansciipLs * i Hie pnliu .iiul IXTS mien inv ivifh (he
alleged victim. The victim, who clearly felt responsible for the sexual conduct, ako pla • J
described sexual contac; hctu een he: >cl fand the Defendant, whom she eventual* -. ^\^ \
reluctantly , u^ciiix.'

;

_

, not icual nlhei .in m.ihihly or re**
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v

Based on this information alone, the Court is unable to find that the DCFS interview is "new and
indisputable pivotal evidence" arising after the entry of the plea that would allow for Mr. White's
guilty plea to be withdrawn or showing Mr. White's plea was not done "knowingly" under
U.C.A. §77-13-6.
Mr. White's allegation that because the victim's constitutional rights were violated, he
should be able to withdraw his plea is also without merit. Fourth Amendment rights are personal
and cannot be transferred vicariously. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-134 (U.S. 1978).
Even if the victim's rights were violated and evidence incriminating Mr. White was found, the
exclusionary rule would not apply to him. Id.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, a
defendant must show "(I) counsel's performance was deficient below an objective standard or
reasonable professional judgment, and (ii) counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
State v. Roias-Martinez. 125 P.3d 930, 932 (Utah 2005) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). "Failure to satisfy either prong will result in our concluding that counsels
behavior was not ineffective." Id. at 697. The Strickland test has been applied by the Utah
Supreme Court in deciding whether a guilty plea was based on ineffective counsel.
Roias-Martinez, 125 P.3d at 932. "Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877
(Utah 1993).
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It appears Mr. White claims that his former counsel, Tony Ripjia, was ineffective because
Rippa failed to demand the DCFS interview, he failed to make a motion to the Court to dismiss
the charges when the victim initially did not appear at the preliminary Rearing and he advised Mr.
White to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit. Assuming each off these allegations satisfy
the first prong of Strickland. Mr. White has still failed to show how h^ has been prejudiced by
any of the alleged acts of Rippa. As mentioned above, Mr. White has not shown prejudice from
the DCFS interview. Next, had the case been dismissed because the fitness was late, the State
would have been free to promptly refile after locating the witness. Sta|te v. Morgan, 34 P.3d 767.
The mere failure to insist upon such a procedure rather than wait for tHe witness is not ineffective
assistance of counsel. Further, it is likely that a continuance would halve been granted to the
State because the witness was unavailable. Id.; State v. Rogers, 122 $.3d 661, 668 (Utah Ct.
App. 2005); State v. Atencio. 89 P.3d 191, 194 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). Finally, Mr. Rippa did not
instruct Mr. White to plead guilty to something unsupported by the facts, which will be further
explained below.
Defendant's Understanding of the Elements and Natur^ of the Crime
As stated earlier, a plea of guilty "may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." U.C.A. § y7-13-6(a) (2006). Further,
under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court mijist make specific findings
that "the defendant [understood] the nature and elements of the offence to which the plea is
entered." Id. at Rule 11(e)(4)(A). "Because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a
Page 5 of 10

formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an
understanding of the law in relation to the facts." State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440,444 (Utah
1984). hi finding that the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense, the
record may reflect compliance by the Court through multiple means including by "transcript of
the oral colloquy between the court and defendant." State v. Penman. 964 P.2d 1157,1160 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998)(internal citations omitted).
Under U.C.A. §76-10-1206,
(1) A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, knowing that a person is a
minor, or having negligently or recklessly failed to determine the proper age of a minor, he:
(a) intentionally distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to exhibit to a minor
any material harmful to minors;
(b) intentionally produces, presents, or directs any performance before a minor, that is
harmful to minors; or
(c) intentionally participates in any performance before a minor, that is harmful to
minors.
(2006). The Code defines 'harmful to minors' as:
that quality of any description or representation, in whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct,
sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse when it:
(a) taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors;
(b) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with
respect to what is suitable material for minors; and
(c) taken as a whole, does not have serious value for minors. Serious value includes only
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for minors.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201. The Utah Supreme Court has found that this definition is
constitutionally valid. State v. Burke, 675 P.2d 1198,1200 (Utah 1984).
Mr. White first claims that the Utah Code violates the Constitution. The Utah Supreme
Court has clearly found that the definition of 'harmful to minors' does not offend the
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Constitution, Id. He next claims that he did not understand the nature and elements of the
offense at the time of his guilty plea. The transcript of Mr. White's plea reveals that Judge Lynn
Davis stated the elements of the dealing in material harmful to a minor and Mr. White told Judge
Davis that he understood the charge. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing on January 18,2006,
pages 3-4. Later in the proceeding, the prosecutor stated the factual basis for the charge as
follows:
Between June 1,2005 and October 1, 2005 the defendant was engaged with - in a sexual
relationship with a 14-year-old girl in Highland, which is in Utah County. As part of that
relationship he had her take pictures of himself while sexually aroused, and they were
pornographic - those pictures are pornographic in nature... She not Wy took the pictures. She
also saw them, viewed them... Exhibited them to her.
Id. at 8-9. Following the prosecutor's description, the Court asked M t White if that was what
happened. Mr. White responded, "Yes, sir." Id. at 8. Further, Mr. White signed a statement in
support of a guilty plea, stating that he understood the nature and the elements of the crime and
that he committed the crime alleged. His attorney also signed the statement, stating that he
believed that Mr. White understood the meaning of the statement. Infcoththe statement and
record, Mr. White also asserted that his guilty plea was done voluntarily. This Court concludes
that Mr, White understood the nature and elements of the offense anc| the law in relation to the
facts of the case. Accordingly, this Court finds that Mr. White's guiliy plea was knowing and
voluntary.
Terms of Plea Agreement and Related Penalty
Under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court can only accept a plea if "the
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defendant knows of the minimum and maximum sentence" and when a plea agreement is
reached, what the agreement is. Rule 11(e). "When a plea agreement is breached by the
prosecutor, the proper remedy is either specific performance of the plea agreement or withdrawal
of the guilty plea both at the discretion of the trial judge." State v. Smit. 2004 UT App 222, P 17,
95 P.3d 1203.
Mr. White claims that he did not know that he could go to jail for these crimes,
Additionally, he asserts by affidavit that as part of the plea agreement, the prosecutor promised
that he would get no jail and no registration as a sex offender. In addition to Mr. White's
affidavit, the only evidence the Court has regarding the terms of the plea agreement is Mr.
White's statement in support of a guilty plea and the transcript of his plea. According to the
statement, "all the promises, duties and provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained
in this statement." Statement at 5. The only terms of the agreement in the statement are "plead
guilty to both charges under 76-10-1206(1) and refer matter to AP&P for sentencing
recommendation." Id. The Statement further explains that any sentencing recommendation is
not binding upon the judge. Id. The transcript supports this and adds that in exchange for Mr.
White's plea the State agreed to dismiss the two rape counts against Mr. White. Transcript at 2.
The Court also specifically told Mr. White of the possible punishments for the two third-degree
felonies, which included incarceration. Id. at 3.
From the sparse evidence provided by both parties, the Court is unable to find that the
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plea agreement contained additional terms than those stated to Judge Davis and those in Mr.
White's statement in support of a guilty plea. The Court finds that the agreement required the
State to dismiss the rape charges if Mr. White pled guilty to the two counts of dealing in harmful
material to a minor and that the matter would be referred to AP&P for sentencing. Even if the
Court found that Mr. White's vague statements about the prosecutor promising no jail and no sex
offender registration were established, it would be premature for the Court to find that the State
breached those promises because the State has made no recommendations to the Court regarding
sentencing at this time.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Daniel Steven White's motion is denied.
Sentencing will proceed as scheduled on December 7, 2006. Counsel for the State is directed to
file an order and findings consistent with this decision.
Dated this £
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DISCUSSION
SENTENCE IMPOSED

3
12

P-R-0-C-E-E-D-I--N--G--S
(February 15, 2007).
THE JUDGE:

State versus White.

All right, counsel, we1re here for sentencing if
you wish to be heard.
MR. BURTON:

Good morning, Your Honor.

Burton for the defendant.

Thomas M.

The defendant is present along

with his a, parents and brother.

May I approach the court?

THE JUDGE:

Sure.

MR. BURTON:

I have here a certificate from a, MPI

which is the Pralta (phonetic) Alcohol Treatment Program in
Oakland, California.
THE JUDGE:
MR. BURTON:

Has the state seen this?
No, Ifm going to give them a copy

too.
THE JUDGE:

Show them first. Okay.

MR. BURTON:

And this, Your Honor, I submit is key

to this defendant's turn around.

He's had a very grievous

problem, started with a severe automobile accident where he
was a pedestrian, was hit by a car.

And a, before that

football was his life and this ruined his hopes and dreams
both in high school and college football.

Got on pain

medications, became very depressed, got involved with alcohol
and drinking, self-medication.
Finally I believe he has reached the point where he
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is ready to stand on his own feet.

This is the reason he

checked himself in, successfully completed it.

This is one

of the top three or four programs in the country with a
tremendously successful rate.
Since July 10th when he was released he has been
clean, hefs been sober.

Ifve checked with him often.

tried to be like a sponsor to him.
was to call me.

I've

If he had any problem he

Fortunately his friends also supported him

and kept him out of trouble.

He went into confinement here

on this matter in December 7th so during that time he of
course was sober and I stayed in close touch with him.
Since December 7th he has been incarceration here.

I believe

he served 33 days in jail and 45 days in the diagnostic
unit.
And a, I have great confidence in this young man.
I have known his family for exactly 30 years.

I was

neighbors with his grandfather in California, very close,
his grandfather's son and my son grew up together and were
best friends.
this young man.

I, I have personal interest in the success of
He's very bright, he's ready to move on with

his life and to do good.
And I strongly recommend that he has served enough
time on this plea to which he pled guilty, this agreement.
I believe the agreement initially with my predecessor counsel
was that there would be no recommended a, prison time at all,
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1

and I believe it was that there a would be no statement in

2

regard to jail.

3

jail.

But he's been I submit both in prison and in

And he's, his goal is fixed on a, college,

4
5

reactivation in his church.

I am personally acquainted with

6

a, someone who runs the Bechtel Investments which is a

7

company his father was vice president qf and which I

8

personally have represented in California for years.

9

person is Richard Kopp (phonetic), he ajssisted in getting

That

10

the, getting Dan into treatment in Calilfornia and a, he's in,

11

he's a member of the stake presidency o|f the Danville

12

stake.

13

Mr. White would prefer and is determined as soon as

14

he's able to leave Utah and resume his iLife in California

15

where both I and Mr. Kopp would stay in close touch with him

16

since I'm back and forth all the time.

17

So I strongly urge and recommend that this young

18

man be released.

We've also asked that these a, two felony

19

charges be combined into one since they were part of the

20

same process and sign, date, everythingt

21

court consider reducing this one fleeting incident to a

22

Class A misdemeanor and that he be released.

23

to see him released altogether.

24

like to use the interstate compact in oifder to have him do

25

that in California.

Also that the

I would like

If there is a probation we'd

I think it's important that he get away

COURT PROCEEDINGS

from whatever influences he may have been involved with here
in this state and start anew down there.

He has no adult

criminal record and a, and he's had nothing in the last seven
years that would suggest that he's a risk to society or to
himself.

He's turned the corner, I am firmly convinced of

that.
And I'm happy to have the court question him if the
court wishes, and I don't—
THE JUDGE:

Ms. Kelly?

MS. KELLY:

Your Honor if I could just review what

the plea, statement in advance of plea says.
THE JUDGE:

The statement in advance of plea

agreement and the statement in advance of plea says plead
guilty to both charges and refer matter to Adult Probation
and Parole for sentencing and recommendation.
MS. KELLY:

That's it.

I had agreed with Mr. Ripple

(phonetic) his previous counsel not to recommend a prison
term.

But there was, according to my memory there was no

agreement on jail in the county jail.

I was free to

recommend that.
THE JUDGE:

It doesn't, it doesn't say.

It just

says refer for Adult Probation and Parole recommendation.
whatever, that's all that's in the memorandum.

Whatever, I'm

at your mercy as though what you agreed, I don't have
whatever—
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So

MS. KELLY:

1
2

Okay.

I'm willing to concede that we

agreed not to recommend a prison term.
The victim's family in this case is not here

3
4

present but has, has been to numerous Court hearings on this

5

and they did write a letter to the court.

6

are, would like to see a prison term imposed.

I believe they

I really have enjoyed working with Mr. Burton but I

7
8

strongly disagree with his assessment of Mr. White.

9

he's a serious risk to the community.

I think

He's had years of

10

sexual offending issues that he refused to deal with and

11

still even now.

12

to the diagnostic and cooperate and get a good recommendation

13

from them he either would not or could not do that.

14

he's a serious risk to the community and to young girls.

Even when it was to his advantage to go up

He's,

15

Another individual called me recently, he's the

16

father of a young girl whom Daniel White had contact with

17

while he was awaiting sentencing on this case, she was 17 at

18

the time.

19

him.

20
21
22

He's here if the court woul<^ want to hear from

Took advantage of, of his daughter.
So I think he's a serious risk to the young girls

of whatever community he's in.
We'd ask that the court, in addition to what's

23

been recommended we'd ask that he have no contact with

24

minors whatsoever because I think that that's a, what's

25

required to protect the community in this case.

COURT PROCEEDINGS

1

So other than that we'll submit it.

2

MR. BURTON:

I'd like to simply respond.

This

3

is the purpose of my motions and by memorandum is that this

4

case needs to stay focused on the guilty plea.

5

we're here about today.

6

at all.

If we

And none of this has any relevance

want it get fair afield and talk about a , —

THE JUDGE:

7

That's what

Well I think his attitude and his

8

amenability to treatment or therapy is certainly relevant to

9

sentencing, isn't it?

10

MR. BURTON:

11

his self referrals t o —
THE JUDGE:

12
13

relevant, isn't it?

14

sentencing?

Well, but the question is it's
Isn't his attitude relevant to

MR. BURTON:

15
16

I believe his attitude is manifest by

Well, his attitude is always

relevant.
THE JUDGE:

17

I understand that you're telling me

18

your position is he has a good attitude.

19

it's something I must consider, is it not?
MR. BURTON:

20

But it is relevant,

If the court please, that is relevant

21

in a sense as long as we stay focused on what he pled guilty

22

to.

23

was there being required to disclose and reveal everything

24

ever in his life and I —

25

His attitude in the diagnostic was my doing because he

THE JUDGE:

Counsel, why would you do that as an
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officer of the court if it was your doing?

Why would you

counsel, why would you as an officer of the court cause
someone to frustrate and undermine an order that I have
made?
MR. BURTON:

I am not seeking to frustrate your

orders, Your Honor, I ! m—
THE JUDGE:

You directed your client to not

participate.
MR. BURTON:

To not answer questions that would

be possible subject him to prosecution.

And as I submitted

in my last memorandum, authority from the United States
Supreme Court that in any proceeding, administrative or
whatever, he is not required nor should he be required to
answer questions which then could subject him to further
prosecution.
THE JUDGE:
MR. BURTON:
had to do that.

Okay.

I understand.

I had no choice, to protect him I

I don't know what the practice is here.

Someone could say well we would never do that, this is part
of the treatment.
Also I have serious reservations as to these kinds
of treatments.
cases.

They don!t seem to be helpful in most

They are subject to a great deal of criticism in

terms of forcing people to acknowledge responsibilities where
they have none, to not comply, and to say that they are
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1

terrible, that they, they have problems, that they don't

2

have, that they are recidivus when they are not.

3

total brainwashing.

4

this unit and its, and its methodology but I have sued a

5

number of programs dealing with youth in this state and

6

others that use this same methodology which does nothing

7

but increase rage and because post-traumatic stress.

8

you may want to force someone and beat them down to

9

confessing everything in their life is their fault and have

It's

And I have not only have criticisms of

Yes,

10

to rebuilt them again.

But confrontation has never in any

11

evidentiary way, even (inaudible word) way shown to be

12

successful in long-term turnarounds.

And it's, there are

13

numerous studies I can cite on that.

It's just not a good

14

program.
Here's a young man who did not pray on anybody, has

15
16

never done anything to force anyone.

17

case submitted she was the instigator and refused to

18

implicate him for that reason.

19

program he's being forced to say everything is my fault, I'm

20

the predator, I'm responsible, I did this wrong, I did that

21

wrong, when it's not the truth.

22

truth.

23

they are somehow criminal liabilities and a danger to

24

society is completely wrong.

25

The young woman in this

And yet in that diagnostic

I'm interested in the

And to brainwash people into convincing them that

So I, I tried to meet with a, corrections and get
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1

the manuals for this kind of program and whoever thought up

2

this kind of methodology, and very difficult to obtain them..

3

I, and I continued with the presentence report, I continued

4

with Dr. (inaudible word) report.

5

total bias, total one-sidedness.

Total misrepresentations,

And so please don't, please don't blame this

6
7

defendant for not being cooperative and not admitting he's a

8

terrible person and not admitting he needs help and treatment

9

as a sexual predator.

I don't believe he is, I don't believe

10

he believes he is, and I resent the state trying to force him

11

into thinking he is. The only thing we're talking about here

12 were two fleeting pictures which he didn't take or you know,
13

the court knows all of that.
THE JUDGE:

14
15

All right.

Is there anything more?

Mr. White, do you wish to be heard?

16

MR. BURTON:

Yes.

17

THE DEFENDANT:

I think he does.

Yes, Your Honor.

I realize that

18

what I did was wrong, I shouldn't have allowed it to

19

happen.

20

years where this is, this case has been going on I have a,

21

tried to get into college.

22

up getting arrested the day that I was supposed to go, so

23

that fell through.

I'm trying to change my life.

In the last two

I was scheduled to go and I ended

24

I've been talking to a lot of my a, past

25

girlfriends and a, basically apologizing for any of the rude
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or a, bad things that I've ever done to them.

I am

currently in contact with four of them which a, have been a,
good support system in my trying to get off of alcohol and
drugs.

I'm currently a, talking to one of them about

possibly getting married.
I'm just hoping the court will give me a chance to
try again.

This is my first offense as an adult.

And I

pretty much stayed clean and out of the court system for
seven years, my last offense was when I was 12 years old.
And I just want a chance.
THE JUDGE:
matters.

Well, counsel, these are serious

The court does not view offenses as minor

offenses, they are serious offenses.

And a, I'm satisfied

from the reports and the information that I do have that your
client, I cannot find that the client is safe to be released
in the community, I haven't been given any realistic
alternatives.
I'm going to sentence Mr. White to a term in the
Utah State Prison not to exceed five years on each of the two
Counts, those Counts may run concurrently one with the
other.

A fine in the amount of $2,000.

I am going to order

you committed to the Utah State Prison for execution of the
sentence.
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.
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